Introduction
12 January 2007
Comments by juni0r
Soon to be included here is a new, more upto date entry regarding the current condition of the New Zealand Defence Forces (NZDF) and the direction it is taking. Essentially it follows on from earlier articles published here and considers positive steps in the right direction and also some pressing matters which are still to be addressed.
Any queries, matters of interest you may have concerning the NZDF can be forwarded to the webmaster in the usual way. Your opinions and insights are readily encouraged. Any such correspondence will be dealt with in complete confidence. Thank you.
A list of topics to be covered includes;
• Third RF Infantry battalion - raising a light infantry combined arms battalion (CAB)
• ORBAT - a recommended make up of the unit
• Tactical Disposition and Weapons - recommended tactics and new weapons
• Close Air Support - the urgent need for independent CAS for force protection
• Recruitment - quality vs. quantity, preparation kits, competition with private sector
• Maritime Counter Terrorism - an analysis of maritime requirements and shortfalls
• Ready Reaction Company - ISTAR focus of such a proposed force
• Reconnaissance - history, concept and application in contemporary military operations
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Proposal of RNZAF Air Defence Company
10 October 2007
Comments by juni0r
New Zealand Defence Forces are severely vulnerable to air attack with only a limited capacity to protect its airspace against such threats. With the disbandment of the Combat Air Wing this has been infinitely increased. If we are unable to meet even a minimal threat of such nature out at sea, as the Skyhawks allowed, then as a cheaper but less effective counter to this problem Air Defence options is proposed. This would consist of several batteries along our vast coastline. More critical and pressing is protection of operationally deployed units. The RNZAF would operate such forces in close cooperation with enhanced Army assets increasing interoperational capacity. All options can also be mounted on vehicles for higher levels of mobility and deployment.
Such an option becomes even more pertinent with the disbanding of the
Air Combat Wing. With both static and mobile forces of this kind we
can have an adequate defence against incoming air attack. This does
negate an ability to strike at any threat out at sea, but it does provide
with additional early warning. Matched to Electronic Warfare (EW) of
the RNZN this would provide the best means of national defence outside
of reinstating an offensive air capacity.
It must be stressed, for a country of the geographical disposition of
New Zealand, the best defence is good offence, the battle being fought
out at sea, where our land assets, both civil and military, are at minimal
risk.
New Zealand has not only a long reaching coastline but also distant
strategic responsibilities to its neighbours. This strategic concern
is intrinsically linked with trade and an ability to demonstrate the
willingness to maintain these wider global concerns. The Navy gives
New Zealand the ability, given appropriate assets, to provide anything
from civil defence duties in outlying islands to providing direct security
to military or humanitarian relief as has been demonstrated with East
Timor.
It is accepted that to raise such a unit poses problems due to the challenges faced in regards retention and recruitment but, particularly for deployed forces, and issues of full spectrum force protection this can not be ignored.
Regards vehicles for mobile units, 1RNZIR has the majority of NZLAV
assets for mobilisation. The remainder constitute use for 2/1RNZIR,
training and, theoretically armoured recce. Some of these vehicles,
perhaps two six vehicle batteries and four additional for command and
control would allow for a realistic and affordable anti-air component
to the force. Ideally additional vehicles would be brought for the purpose
but the aforementioned considers minimal cost and integration.
A proposed force would consist of three troops. One based in Auckland / Whenuapai, one in Linton / Ohakea and another in Christchurch / Burnham. The two North Island units would be drawn from the FSV roled LAV based in Linton presently. The South Island unit would be drawn from the QAMR.
Each of the three troops would consist of:
4x Air Defence (AD) armed LAV
1x Direct Fire (DF) 25mm turret armed LAV
1x Command Post (CP) LAV
4x LOV
The DF vehicle will have the usual 3+7 compliment for rapid mounted
/ dismounted reconnaissance, while the LOV will each have 1+5 for ammunition,
logistical and troop self protection duties. Typical personnel per troop
would be 57, of enhanced platoon in size.
The 18 vehicles would simply be re-roled from those allocated as of
the Army's plan of 28 June 2004. They would be staffed by RNZAF and
a NZ Army cadre. The concept provides a dual role of air cover for Army
assets and air defence for air ports and Air Force assets.
What follows is a brief on three possible systems:
Rapier
Rapier is used by Australia's 16 Air Defence (Light) Regiment 110 AD
Battery. It is due for replacement in Australian service and it
would be worth considering purchasing these weapons off Australia as
a interim measure. They are still a viable option for another decade
or more and this is purely a self defence acquisition for defending
our lengthy coastline from air attack. Used with great effect in the
Falklands, this system has a modern upgrade path, as shown with the
UK Rapier 2000. Logistics,initial training and support can be
provided by either the UK or Australia. Units like Singapore's
Air Defence Brigade of the RSAF, whom are responsible for national air
defence operations, use Rapier. Rapier is a battle tested system
and has a solid record. Portable variants for mobility are available.
Bofors RSB-70/90
This missile system is used by Australia's 16 Air Defence (Light) Regiment
111 AD Battery. This laser guided SAM is also used by the RSAF
Divisional Air Defence Artillery Brigade. ARMAD is a three man
turret version which holds the radar and Fire Control System (FCS) needed
for self contained operation. It is let down by its relatively
short range of five kilometres but RSB-70 is man portable, while also
being more typically mounted on light vehicles. The RSB-90 has
a greater range and more effective warhead thanks to the advances of
technology.
ADATS
Air Defence Anti-tank System uses a dual purpose warhead meaning the
system can engage both Armour and air targets, out to a range of 10
kilometres, while detection is over twice that. The platform has eight
laser guided missiles ready for launch. Two men can reload the ADATS
without need for additional logistical support. A six unit battery can
be linked to a common network, elements upto 20 kilometres apart sharing
battlefield data. Both armoured mobile and static defence options are
available.
With NZLAV now in service the Army could most certainly look into the
feasibility of placing the weapons and targeting systems of ADATS onto
these vehicles. Switzerland use the ADATS on wheeled vehicles. It would
provide a solid standoff engagement of any modern armoured vehicles.
Main Battle Tanks have typical main gun range of three kilometres. Such
a system therefore permits much greater protection of the asset. It
also provides (mounted on NZLAV) a rapid deployment with the force it
intends to protect. This compliments Javelin MAAW dismounted 2000 metre
range.
Both Canada and the Royal Thai Air Force use ADATS, as well as Switzerland.
The system is a joint project between Switzerland and Canada through
Oerlikon Aerospace Inc. A Mk2 ADATS updating of technologies will keep
this option on the leading edge of the battlefield for many years to
come.
It should be stressed that, if the multi-role ADATS was adopted, the FSV role would persist, with the given vehicles simply in the Anti-tank role with increased range and lethality.
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Defence Letter 09 September 2002
04 August 2007
Comments by juni0r
For those who are interested, my letter to the then Minister of Defence, Mark Burton in 2002, has been reintroduced to the site. It includes comments and is in .pdf format. While some notable progress has been made, such as the introduction of Javelin, and major Navy fleet investments (long overdue), many questions therein remain unanswered. I would encourage the letter's download and comments from readers.
Click on the link below and download in the usual way as per your particular browser and operating system.
http://juni0r.orcon.net.nz/DefenceLetterTHS_2002.pdf
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Infantry Battalion
23 February 2007
Comments by juni0r
While there is call for a light infantry company for a rapid reaction
capability this, while addressing the needs for light infantry despite
the moblising of 1RNZIR with NZLAV, fails to deal with or reflect the
critical issue of manning in regards the infantry role and in general.
East Timor has seen the need to draw on other Corps to train and perform
patrolling duties of infantry, while even recently Territorial Force
(TF) personnel have been drawn upon to allow for operations in the Solomon
Islands.
While reserve personnel perform critical roles in allowing for tour
rotations they should not be a requirement in this capacity, rather
an opportunity operationally for such personnel to gain experience in
soldiering increasing their value to both operations and their respective
units. As it stands it has consistently become mandatory for TF participation
since 1999 to be active in these roles in order for Regular Forces to
maintain acceptable levels of down time between missions. Even so, many
soldiers were, as in the case of East Timor, compelled into repeated
tours.
The addition of a single Infantry company does not permit for a complete
rotation of a Battalion group and therefore one must be provided in
an ad hoc fashion. The current capacity of two Regular Force (RF) battalions,
one mobile and one light, does not allow for appropriate tactical, strategic
or operational "one up, one in transit and one in training".
The only realistic solution is the raising of a new battalion as the
current situation is unsustainable, putting undue strain on Defence
capabilities and human resources. It therefore contributes to unacceptable
risks to personnel in the execution of their duties.
While proposing the raising of a additional battalion and its requirement
is obvious even to the most left of political thinkers, it will only
serve to remedy the manning issues aforementioned. While this is a big
step in and of itself it does not assist in serving other substantial
existing policy gaps.
The requirements for rapidly deployable light infantry forces are evident
in recent times including the Solomon Islands, Tonga and East Timor.
Reconnaissance capabilities are vital in all military operations and
its effectiveness lays the seeds for success. This is substantial in
the advocation of a light infantry ready reaction force company focusing
in recce.
With the kinds of confusion and difficulties associated with assigning
units new roles and tasks, and often on short notice for operational
requirements it makes sense to press the acknowledged shortfalls in
Defence policy with those of creating a new unit, thereby having it
focus on the needs of government, the New Zealand Defence Forces and
potential deployment necessities. This in additional also serves to
implement and remedy those lessons of most recent experiences of the
NZDF.
This leads to the conclusion that a newly raised RF infantry battalion
should specialise in the requirements of ISTAR - Intelligence, Surveillance,
Targeting and Reconnaissance. While a single company within each RF
battalion should consist of recce specialists for a battalion a specialist
battalion allows for the utalisation of unit level assets and greater
options for commanders both militarily and in the assistance of civil
powers in times of major crisis or minor emergency.
These assets and the unit's proposed composition will be addressed at
a later date. For the meantime it is enough to say that the contemporary
Combined Arms Battalion (CAB) approach, molded to the recce focus would
both suit the requirements of policy and provide the tactical flexibility
to remain effective for all likely required contingencies. The CAB would
include mobility elements, NZLAV assets equipped with the appropriate
on board technologies, engineer and logistical sub units.
Additional contemporary experience and modern thinking has promoted
the most flexible tactical approaches at the lowest possible levels,
paving the way for more appropriate use of assets where and when they
are needed on the battlefield and in OOTW (Operations other than War).
This is somewhat different to historical methods where there has been
much greater top down influence than is wise for modern operations.
This rethink may indeed have greater financial costs but in the interests
of effective resolution and reduction of casualties on the ground it
has already demonstrated the benefits of the adjusted mindset. Additionally,
the investment in such a specialist battalion serves to reduce costs
overall for what would otherwise be ad-hoc solutions as issues arise,
both incurring greater costs financially but also upon personnel and
operational effectiveness.
A dedicated Recce Battalion permits the countering of such counter productive
environments while allowing for several rotational sub units as it pertains
to the Ready Reaction Force Company.
In the short term it is suggested that the Recce Company of the proposed
Battalion act as the required Ready Reaction Force (RRF) Company.
Other companies can provide necessary logistical support and specialist
personnel and equipment as dictated by the operational environment.
This will form the required company group appropriate deployment.
In terms of the need to achieve policy objectives this company would have priority within the Battalion with regards being raised. At a later stage other combat core sub units of the Battalion can rotate the responsibility of RRF duties. A six monthly rotation would reduce stresses on personnel regards regular training within the Battalion while giving an RRF unit adequate experience in that essential role.
Mobility squadron would provide one troop (likewise rotated) for the RRF in order that, if the RRF Company is deployed over the period in which they are on standby, they have adequate Force Protection, mobility and fire support.
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Project Protector
12 February 2007
Comments by juni0r
This project is a substantial step forward in the capacities of the Royal New Zealand Navy. With the commissioning of the Off Shore Patrol Vessels (OPV), Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPV) and the Multi-role Vessel (MRV) this modernisation allows the Navy to pursue and plug several Defence policy gaps which have either been completely lacking or have a limited and out dated capacity to fulfill.
The MRV includes required mobility and deployment options for the New
Zealand Army which have been significantly absent in recent operations.
It permits the ferrying of a enhanced company sized unit and up to 40
Light Armoured Vehicles (NZLAV). This is in line with the need for the
NZDF to be able to maintain a light infantry company as a ready reaction
force at short notice.
The MRV, HMNZS Canterbury carries its own SH-2G helicopter, can carry
an additional four of the RNZAF NH90 helicopters and can carry in excess
of thirty cargo containers. There are two 55 tonne Landing Craft Medium
(LCM) vessels to ferry troops, vehicles and equipment to shore. They
are able to carry two NZLAV each. All told the MRV will serve its purpose
well, to the full requirements of the NZDF and would be a considerable
maritime contribution to any coalition effort New Zealand is involved
in in the future.
Two modern Off Shore Vessels (OPV) will permit the surveillance and
security of the country's 200 mile EEZ and further afield. Assisting
in SAR operations, humanitarian work and civil defence missions are
all significant including those pertaining to military operations. With
a capacity to embark thirty personnel in addition to its standard crew
compliment the OPV is able to carry a platoon of soldiers in a rapid
reaction or reconnaissance role. The RNZN Seasprite is able to land
on the IPV further enhancing its operational capabilities and self defence
against various potential threats.
There are four Inshore Patrol Vessels being commissioned in staggered
succession throughout 2007. These will perform similar roles to the
OPV but are operationally limited to approximately 24 nautical miles
from the coastline.
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[ Defence Debate ]
Links
New Zealand Ministry of Defence
New Zealand Armed Forces Memorial Project
Joint Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (JWID) site
Royal New Zealand Corps of Transport
Royal New Zealand Returned Services Association
Victor Company, RNZIR, Vietnam 1967
Tarrackin's Home Scroll
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